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We present a coalgebraic generalisation of Fischer and Ladner’s Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL)
and Parikh’s Game Logic (GL). In earlier work, we proved a generic strong completeness result
for coalgebraic dynamic logics without iteration. The coalgebraic semantics of such programs is
given by a monad T , and modalities are interpreted via a predicate lifting λ whose transpose is a
monad morphism from T to the neighbourhood monad. In this paper, we show that if the monad
T carries a complete semilattice structure, then we can define an iteration construct, and suitable
notions of diamond-likeness and box-likeness of predicate-liftings which allows for the definition
of an axiomatisation parametric in T , λ and a chosen set of pointwise program operations. As our
main result, we show that if the pointwise operations are “negation-free” and Kleisli composition
left-distributes over the induced join on Kleisli arrows, then this axiomatisation is weakly complete
with respect to the class of standard models. As special instances, we recover the weak completeness
of PDL and of dual-free Game Logic. As a modest new result we obtain completeness for dual-free
GL extended with intersection (demonic choice) of games.
1 Introduction
Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [4] and its close cousin Game Logic (GL) [14] are expressive,
yet computationally well-behaved extensions of modal logics. Crucial for the increased expressiveness
of these logics is the *-operator (iteration) that allows to compute certain, relatively simple fixpoint
properties such as reachability or safety. This feature comes at a price: completeness proofs for deduction
systems of logics with fixpoint operators are notoriously difficult. The paradigmatic example for this
phenomenon is provided by the modal µ-calculus: Walukiewicz’s completeness proof from [19] for
Kozen’s axiomatisation [10] is highly non-trivial and presently not widely understood.
Our main contribution is a completeness proof for coalgebraic dynamic logics with iteration. We
introduced coalgebraic dynamic logics in our previous work [7] as a natural generalisation of PDL and
GL with the aim to study various dynamic logics within a uniform framework that is parametric in the
type of models under consideration, or - categorically speaking - parametric in a given monad. In [7] we
presented an initial soundness and strong completeness result for such logics. Crucially, however, this
only covered iteration-free variants. This paper provides an important next step by extending our pre-
vious work to the coalgebraic dynamic logic with iteration. As in the case of PDL, strong completeness
fails, hence our coalgebraic dynamic logics with iteration are (only) proved weakly complete. While
the concrete instances of our general completeness result are well-known [11, 14], the abstract coalge-
braic nature of our proof allows us to provide a clear analysis of the general requirements needed for
the PDL/GL completeness proof, leading to the notions of box- and diamond-like modalities and of a
left-quantalic monad. As a modest new completeness result we obtain completeness for dual-free GL
extended by intersection (demonic choice) of games.
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2 Weak Completeness of Coalgebraic Dynamic Logics
At this relatively early stage of development our work has to be mainly regarded as a proof-of-concept
result: we provide evidence for the claim that completeness proofs for so-called exogenous modal logics
can be generalised to the coalgebraic level. This opens up a number of promising directions for future
research which we will discuss in the Conclusion.
2 Coalgebraic Dynamic Logic
2.1 Coalgebraic modal logic
We assume some familiarity with the basic theory of coalgebra [16], monads and categories [13]. We
start by recalling basic notions from coalgebraic modal logic, and fixing notation. For more information
and background on coalgebraic modal logic, we refer to [12].
For a set X , we define Prop(X) to be the set of propositional formulas over X . Formally, Prop(X) is
generated by the grammar: Prop(X) 3 ϕ ::= x ∈ X | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ .
A modal signature Λ is a collection of modalities with associated arities. In this paper, we will only
consider unary modalities. For a set X , we denote by Λ(X) the set of expressions Λ(X) = {3x |3 ∈ Λ}.
The setF (Λ,P0) of Λ-modal formulas over Λ and a set P0 of atomic propositions is given by:
F (Λ,P0) 3 ϕ ::= p ∈ P0 | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ |3ϕ 3 ∈ Λ.
Let T : Set→ Set be a functor. A T -coalgebraic semantics ofF (Λ,P0) is given by associating with
each 3 ∈ Λ a predicate lifting λ : Q⇒Q ◦T , where Q denotes the contravariant powerset functor. A
T -model (X ,γ,V ) then consists of a carrier set X , a T -coalgebra γ : X → T X , and a valuation V : P0→
P(X) that defines truth sets of atomic propositions as [[p]] = V (p). The truth sets of complex formulas
is defined inductively as usual with the modal case given by: [[3ϕ]] = γ−1(λX([[ϕ]])).
A modal logic L = (Λ,Ax,Fr,Ru) consists of a modal signature Λ, a collection of rank-1 axioms
Ax⊆ Prop(Λ(Prop(P0))), a collection Fr⊆F (Λ,P0) of frame conditions, and a collection of inference
rules Ru⊆F (Λ,P0)×F (Λ,P0) which contains the congruence rule: from ϕ↔ ψ infer 3ϕ↔3ψ for
any modality 3 ∈ Λ.
Given a modal logic L = (Λ,Ax,Fr,Ru), the set of L -derivable formulas is the smallest subset
of F (Λ,P0) that contains Ax∪ Fr, all propositional tautologies, is closed under modus ponens, uni-
form substitution and under applications of substitution instances of rules from Ru. For a formula
ϕ ∈ F (Λ,P0) we write `L ϕ if ϕ is L -derivable. Furthermore ϕ is L -consistent if 6`L ¬ϕ and a
finite set Φ⊆F (Λ,P0) isL -consistent if the formula ∧Φ isL -consistent.
Next, we recall the following one-step notions from the theory of coalgebraic logic. Let X be a set.
• A formula ϕ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(X))) is one-step L -derivable, denoted `1L ϕ , if ϕ is propositionally
entailed by the set {ψτ | τ : P→P(X),ψ ∈ Ax}.
• A setΦ⊆Prop(Λ(P(X))) is called one-stepL -consistent if there are no formulas ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ∈Φ
such that `1L ϕ1∧·· ·∧ϕn→⊥.
• Let T be a Set-functor and assume a predicate lifting λ3 is given for each 3 ∈ Λ. For a formula
ϕ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(X))) the one-step semantics [[ϕ]]1 ⊆ T X is defined by putting [[3(U)]]1 = λ3X (U)
and by inductively extending this definition to Boolean combinations of boxed formulas.
• For a set Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(P(X))) of formulas, we let [[Φ]]1 =
⋂
ϕ∈Φ[[ϕ]]1 , and we say that Φ is one-
step satisfiable if [[Φ]]1 6= /0.
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• L is called one-step sound if for any one-step derivable formula ϕ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(X))) we have
[[ϕ]]1 = T X , i.e., if any such formula ϕ is one-step valid.
• L is called one-step complete if for every finite set X and every one-step consistent set Φ ⊆
Prop(Λ(P(X))) is one-step satisfiable.
2.2 Dynamic syntax and semantics
In earlier work [7], we introduced the notion of a coalgebraic dynamic logic for programs built from
Kleisli composition, pointwise operations and tests. Here we extend this notion to also include iteration
(Kleene star).
Throughout, we fix a countable set P0 of atomic propositions, a countable set A0 of atomic actions,
and a signature Σ (of pointwise operations such as ∪ in PDL). The setF (P0,A0,Σ) of dynamic formulas
and the set A = A(P0,A0,Σ) of complex actions are defined by mutual induction:
F (P0,A0,Σ) 3 ϕ ::= p ∈ P0 | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | 〈α〉ϕ
A(P0,A0,Σ) 3 α ::= a ∈ A0 | α;α | σ(α1, . . . ,αn) | α∗ | ϕ?
where σ ∈ Σ is n-ary.
Dynamic formulas are interpreted in dynamic structures which consist of a T -coalgebraic semantics
with additional structure. Operation symbols σ ∈ Σ will be interpreted by pointwise defined opera-
tions on (T X)X induced by natural operations σ : T n ⇒ T . More precisely, if σ : T n ⇒ T is a natural
transformation, then σXX : ((T X)X)n→ (T X)X is defined by σXX ( f1, . . . , fn)(x) = σX( f1(x), . . . , fn(x)). A
natural transformation ΣT ⇒ T (when viewing Σ as a Set-functor) corresponds to a collection of natural
operations σ : T n⇒ T , one for each σ ∈ Σ.
In order to define composition and tests of actions/programs/games, T must be a monad (T,µ,η)
such that action composition amounts to Kleisli composition for T . In order to define iteration of pro-
grams, we need to assume that the monad has the following property.
Definition 2.1 (Left-quantalic monad) A monad (T,µ,η) is called left-quantalic if for all sets X , T X
can be equipped with a sup-lattice structure (i.e., a complete, idempotent, join semilattice). We denote
the empty join in T X by ⊥T X . We also require that when this join is lifted pointwise to the Kleisli Hom-
setsK `(T )(X ,X), then Kleisli-composition left-distributes over joins:
∀ f ,gi : X → T X , i ∈ I : f ∗
∨
i
gi =
∨
i
f ∗gi. /
It is well known that Eilenberg-Moore algebras of the powerset monadP are essentially sup-lattices,
and that relation composition left-distributes over unions of relations, hence P is left-quantalic. We
observe that one way of showing that T is left-quantalic is to show that there is a morphism of monads
τ : P ⇒ T .
Lemma 2.2 Let (T,µ,η) be a monad. If there is a monad morphism τ : P ⇒ T , then (T,µ,η) is
left-quantalic.
Proof. A monad morphism τ : P ⇒ T induces a functor EM (T )→ EM (P) by pre-composition.
It follows, in particular, that the free T -algebra is mapped to a sup-lattice (T X ,µX ◦ τT X). We extend
this sup-lattice structure on T X pointwise to a sup-lattice structure on K `(T )(X ,X), that is, for all
{gi | i ∈ I} ⊆K `(T )(X ,X),
(
∨
i
gi)(x) = µX(τT X({gi(x) | i ∈ I})).
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Kleisli-composition distributes over this τ-induced join since µX and T f preserve it, for all functions
f : X → Y , due to naturality of τ , and these maps being T -algebra morphisms. QED
Note that any natural transformation τ : P⇒ T yields a natural transformation 1⇒P⇒ T , where
1⇒P picks out the empty set, such that T is pointed as defined in [7].
Example 2.3 The three monads of particular interest to us were described in [7]: The powerset monad
P , the monotone neighbourhood monadM , the neighbourhood monadN . These are all left-quantalic.
For example, the transpose of the Kripke box “2= τX : PX→MX defined by τX(U) = {V ⊆ X |U ⊆V}
is a monad morphism. The join on MX induced by “2 is intersection of neighbourhood collections.
Dually, the transpose of the Kripke diamond “3X(U) = {V ⊆ X |U ∩V 6= /0} is also a monad morphism
P ⇒M , and its induced join is unions of neighbourhood collections.
The generalisation of iteration for PDL-programs and GL-games is iterated Kleisli composition.
Given f : X → T X , we define for all n < ω:
f [0] = ηX , f [n+1] = f ∗ f [n], f ∗ =
∨
n<ω
f [n] (1)
Definition 2.4 (Dynamic semantics) Let T = (T,η ,µ) be a left-quantalic monad, and θ : ΣT ⇒ T a
natural Σ-algebra. A (P0,A0,θ)-dynamic T-modelM= (X ,γ0,λ ,V ) consists of a set X , an interpretation
of atomic actions γ̂0 : A0→ (T X)X , a unary predicate lifting λ : Q⇒Q◦T whose transpose λ̂ : T ⇒N
is a monad morphism, and a valuation V : P0→P(X). We define the truth set [[ϕ]]M of dynamic formulas
and the semantics γ̂ : A→ (T X)X of complex actions inM by mutual induction:
[[p]]M =V (p), [[ϕ ∧ψ]]M = [[ϕ]]M∩ [[ψ]]M, [[¬ϕ]]M = X \ [[ϕ]]M,
[[〈α〉ϕ]]M = (γ̂(α)−1 ◦λX)([[ϕ]]M),
γ̂(σ(α1, . . . ,σn)) = σXX (γ̂(α1), . . . , γ̂(αn)) where σ ∈ Σ is n-ary,
γ̂(α;β ) = γ̂(α)∗ γ̂(β ) (Kleisli composition),
γ̂(α∗) = γ̂(α)∗ (Kleisli iteration),
γ̂(ϕ?)(x) = ηX(x) if x ∈ [[ϕ]]M, ⊥T X otherwise.
We say that M validates a formula ϕ if [[ϕ]]M = X . A coalgebra γ : X → (T X)A is standard if it is
generated by some γ̂0 : A0→ (T X)X and V : P0→P(X) as above, and we will also refer to (X ,γ,λ ,V )
as a θ -dynamic T-model. /
Recall that PDL can be axiomatised using the box or using the diamond, but the two axiomatisations
differ. For example, the axioms for tests depend on which modality is used. In the general setting we
need to know whether a predicate lifting corresponds to a box or a diamond.
Definition 2.5 (Diamond-like, Box-like) Let λ : Q⇒Q ◦T be a predicate lifting for a left-quantalic
monad T . We say that
• λ is diamond-like if for all sets X , all U ⊆ X , and all {ti | i ∈ I} ⊆ T X :∨
i∈I
ti ∈ λX(U) iff ∃i ∈ I : ti ∈ λX(U).
• λ is box-like if for all sets X , all U ⊆ X , and all {ti | i ∈ I} ⊆ T X :∨
i∈I
ti ∈ λX(U) iff ∀i ∈ I : ti ∈ λX(U).
/
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Remark 2.6 Note that λ is diamond-like iff λX(U) is a complete filter of the semilattice T X for all
U ⊆ X. One also easily verifies that λ is diamond-like iff its Boolean dual is box-like. It is easy to see
that if λ is diamond-like then it is also diamond-like according to our “old” definition in [7], similarly for
box-like. However, it is no longer the case that every predicate lifting is either box-like or diamond-like,
e.g., for T =P , λX(U) = {V ⊆ X | /0 6=V ⊆U} is neither.
Example 2.7 It can easily be verified that the Kripke diamond (box) is indeed diamond-like (box-like)
forP . Taking T =M , and union as join onMX (i.e., the join induced by “3, cf. Example 2.3), then the
monotonic neighbourhood modality λX(U)= {N ∈MX |U ∈N} is diamond-like, but taking intersection
as the join on MX then λ is box-like. Similarly, λ is diamond-like when viewed as a neighbourhood
modality for N -coalgebras with union as join. Note that this shows that diamond-likeness does not
imply monotonicity. We only have, if λ is diamond-like, then λ̂ : T ⇒N is monotone.
We will use the following crucial lemma about the Kleisli composition and predicate liftings.
Lemma 2.8 Let λ : Q⇒Q◦T be a predicate lifting whose transpose λ̂ : T⇒N is a monad morphism.
For all f ,g : X → T X, all x ∈ X and all U ⊆ X, we have
( f ∗g)(x) ∈ λX(U) ⇐⇒ f (x) ∈ λX(g−1(λX(U)).
Proof. We have:
( f ∗g)(x) ∈ λX(U) iff µX (T g( f (x))) ∈ λX(U)
(def. of λˆ ) iff U ∈ λˆX(µX(T g( f (x)))
(λˆ monad morph.) iff U ∈ µNX
Ä
N λˆX(λˆT X(T g( f (x))))
ä
(def. of µN) iff ηP(X)(U) ∈N λˆX
Ä
λˆT X(T g( f (x)))
ä
(def. ofN ) iff λˆ−1X
Ä
ηP(X)(U)
ä
∈ λˆT X(T g( f (x)))
(def. of η) iff {t ∈ T X |U ∈ λ̂X(t)} ∈ λˆT X(T g( f (x)))
(def. of λˆ ) iff {t ∈ T X | t ∈ λX(U)} ∈ λˆT S(T g( f (x)))
(naturality of λˆ ) iff {t ∈ T X | t ∈ λX(U)} ∈N g(λˆX( f (x)))
(def. ofN ) iff g−1 (λX(U)) ∈ λˆX( f (x))
iff f (x) ∈ λX(g−1(λX(U))) QED
2.3 Coalgebraic dynamic logic
Our notion of a coalgebraic dynamic logic relates to coalgebraic modal logic in the same way that PDL
relates to the basic modal logic K. In the remainder of the paper, we assume that:
• T= (T,µ,η) is a left-quantalic monad with join ∨ : PT X → T X ,
• λ : Q ⇒ Q ◦ T is a diamond-like with respect to (T X ,∨), monotonic predicate lifting whose
transpose λ̂ : T ⇒N is a monad morphism,
• Σ is a signature and for each n-ary σ ∈ Σ there is a natural operation σ : T n ⇒ T and a natural
operation χ : N n⇒N such that λ̂ ◦σ = χ ◦ λ̂ n. We denote by θ the collection {σ | σ ∈ Σ}.
Using the last item above, we showed in [7, section 4] how to associate to each operation symbol σ ∈ Σ
a rank-1 axiom 〈σ(α1, . . . ,αn)〉p↔ ϕ(χ˘,α1, . . . ,αn, p). Briefly stated, we use that a χ : N n ⇒ N
corresponds (via the Yoneda lemma) to an element χ˘ of the free Boolean algebra N (n ·Q(2)) gener-
ated by n ·Q(2). By assigning a rank-1 formula to each of the generators, we obtain a rank-1 formula
ϕ(χ˘,α1, . . . ,αn, p) for each χ . For example, the PDL axiom 〈α ∪β 〉p↔ 〈α〉p∨ 〈β 〉p is of this kind.
Our completeness result will be restricted to positive operations.
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Definition 2.9 (Positive natural operations) We call χ : N n ⇒ N a positive operation if χ˘ can be
constructed using only ∧ and ∨ inN (n ·Q(2)). If σ : T n⇒ T and χ : N n⇒N are such that λ̂ ◦σ =
χ ◦ λ̂ n, then we call σ positive if χ is positive. The axioms for positive pointwise operations of the form
χ˘ = δ˘ ∧ ρ˘ are obtained by extending Definition 14 from [7] with a case for conjunction:
ϕ(δ˘ ∧ ρ˘,α1, . . . ,αn, p) = ϕ(δ˘ ,α1, . . . ,αn, p)∧ϕ(ρ˘,α1, . . . ,αn, p). /
Example 2.10 Positive natural operations on P include union, but complement and intersection are
not natural onP . Positive natural operations onM include union and intersection, but not the natural
operation dual.
Definition 2.11 (Dynamic logic) Let L3 = ({3},Ax, /0,Ru) be a modal logic over the basic modal
language F ({3},P0). We define Λ = {〈α〉 | α ∈ A} and let AxA = ⋃α∈A Axα where Axα is the set of
rank-1 axioms over the labelled modal language F (P0,A0,Σ) obtained by substituting 〈α〉 for 3 in all
the axioms in Ax. We define RuA similarly as all labelled instances of rules in Ru.
The θ -dynamic logic overL3 is the modal logicL =L (θ , ; ,∗ ,?) = (Λ,Ax′,Fr′,Ru′) where
Ax′ = AxA∪{〈σ(α1, . . . ,αn)〉p↔ ϕ(χ˘,α1, . . . ,αn, p) | σ ∈ Σ,αi ∈ A}
Fr′ = {〈α;β 〉p↔ 〈α〉〈β 〉p | α,β ∈ A, p ∈ P0}∪
{〈α∗〉p↔ p∨〈α〉〈α∗〉p | α ∈ A}∪
{〈ψ?〉p↔ (ψ ∧ p) | ψ ∈F (P0,A0,Σ)}
Ru′ = RuA∪
® 〈α〉ψ ∨ϕ → ψ
〈α∗〉ϕ → ψ | α ∈ A
´
/
Proposition 2.12 If L3 is sound wrt to the T -coalgebraic semantics then the θ -dynamic logic L is
sound wrt to the class of all θ -dynamic T-models. In other words, for all ϕ ∈ F (P0,A0,Σ) and all
θ -dynamic T-modelsM= (X ,γ0,λ ,V ) we have
`L ϕ implies that M validates ϕ.
Proof. In [7], we showed soundness of the axioms for pointwise operations, sequential composition and
tests with respect to θ -dynamic T-models (without iteration). Soundness of the star axiom is not difficult
to check. Soundness of the star rule can be proven as follows: SupposeM= (X ,γ,λ ,V ) is a θ -dynamic
T -model such thatM validates the formula 〈α〉ψ ∨ϕ→ ψ . For any state x ∈ X such that x |= 〈α∗〉ϕ we
have — by standardness of γ — that γ̂(α)∗(x) ∈ λX([[ϕ]]). This implies ∨ j γ̂(α)[ j](x) ∈ λX([[ϕ]]) and,
by diamond-likeness of λ , there is a j ≥ 0 such that γ̂(α)[ j](x) ∈ λX([[ϕ]]). Therefore, to show thatM
validates 〈α∗〉ϕ → ψ , it suffices to show that for all j ≥ 0 we have U j ⊆ [[ψ]] where
U j = {x ∈ X | γ̂(α)[ j](x) ∈ λX([[ϕ]])}.
We prove this by induction. For j = 0 the claim holds trivially as by assumption the premiss of the star
rule is valid and thus [[ϕ]]⊆ [[ψ]]. Consider now some j = i+1. Then we have
Ui+1 = {x ∈ X | γ̂(α)[i+1](x) ∈ λX([[ϕ]])}
= {x ∈ X | γ̂(α)∗ γ̂(α)[i](x) ∈ λX([[ϕ]])}
Lemma 2.8
= {x ∈ X | γ̂(α)(x) ∈ λX(Ui)}
I.H.⊆ {x ∈ X | γ̂(α)(x) ∈ λX([[ψ]])}
= [[〈α〉ψ]]⊆ [[ψ]] (last inclusion holds by validity of rule premiss)
QED
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3 Weak Completeness
In this section, we will show that if the base logic L3 is one-step complete with respect to the T -
coalgebraic semantics given by λ , and θ consists of positive operations, then the dynamic logic L =
L (θ , ; ,∗ ,?) is (weakly) complete with respect to the class of all θ -dynamic T-models, i.e., every L -
consistent formula is satisfiable in a θ -dynamic T-model. As in the completeness proof for PDL, a
satisfying model for a formula ψ will essentially be obtained from a filtration of the canonical model
through a suitable closure of {ψ}.
A set Φ⊆F (P0,A0,Σ) of dynamic formulas is (Fischer-Ladner) closed if it is closed under subfor-
mulas, closed under single negation, that is, if ϕ = ¬ψ ∈Φ then ψ ∈Φ, and if ϕ ∈Φ is not a negation,
then ¬ϕ ∈Φ, and satisfies the following closure conditions:
1. If 〈α;β 〉ϕ ∈Φ then 〈α〉〈β 〉ϕ ∈Φ.
2. For all 1-step axioms 〈σ(α1, . . . ,αn)〉p↔ ϕ(χ˘,α1, . . . ,αn, p), if 〈σ(α1, . . . ,αn)〉ψ ∈ Φ then also
ϕ(χ˘,α1, . . . ,αn,ψ) ∈Φ.
3. If 〈ψ?〉ϕ ∈Φ then ψ ∧ϕ ∈Φ.
4. If 〈α∗〉ϕ ∈Φ then 〈α〉〈α∗〉ϕ and 〈α〉ϕ ∈Φ.
Given a dynamic formula ψ , we denote by Cl(ψ) the least set of formulas that is closed and contains
ψ . A standard argument shows that Cl(ψ) is finite.
From now on we fix a finite, closed set Φ (which may be thought of as Cl(ψ) for some ψ). An
L -atom over Φ is a maximally L -consistent subset of Φ, and we denote by S the set of all L -atoms
over Φ. For ϕ ∈F (P0,A0,Σ) we put ϕˆ = {∆ ∈ S | ϕ ∈ ∆}.
Note that, in particular, for each ϕ 6∈ Φ we have ϕˆ = /0. A maximally L -consistent set (MCS) Ξ is a
maximallyL -consistent subset ofF (P0,A0,Σ). Clearly, for each MCS Ξ we have Ξ∩Φ is anL -atom.
Any subset of S can be characterised by a propositional combination of formulas in Φ. It will be useful
to have a notation for these characteristic formulas at hand.
Definition 3.1 (Characteristic formula) For U ⊆ S, we define the characteristic formula ξU of U by
ξU =
∨
∆∈U
∧
∆
where for any ∆ ∈ S, ∧∆ is the conjunction of the elements of ∆. /
We will use the following fact that allows to lift one-step completeness of the base logic toL .
Lemma 3.2 IfL3 is one-step complete for T thenL is one-step complete for T A.
The proof of this lemma is analogous to the proof of the corresponding statement in [6]. The main
difference being that instead of arguing via MCSs one has to use atoms. Note that only the axioms for
pointwise operations have influence on one-step properties, as the ones for ; and ∗ are not rank-1.
3.1 Strongly coherent models
As in the finitary completeness proof of PDL [11] and the finite model construction in [18], we need a
coalgebra structure on the set S of allL -atoms over Φ that satisfies a certain coherence condition which
ensures that a truth lemma can be proved.
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Definition 3.3 (Coherent structure) A coalgebra γ : S → (T S)A is coherent if for all Γ ∈ S and all
〈α〉ϕ ∈Φ, γ̂(α)(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ) iff 〈α〉ϕ ∈ Γ. /
Lemma 3.4 (Truth lemma) Let γ : S→ (T S)A be a coherent structure map and define a valuation V :
P0→P(S) for propositional variables p ∈ P0 by putting V (p) = pˆ. For each Γ ∈ S and ϕ ∈Φ we have
(S,γ,V ),Γ |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ.
The lemma follows from a standard induction argument on the structure of the formula ϕ - the base case
is a immediate consequence of the definition of the valuation, the induction step for the modal operators
follows from coherence.
In order to prove coherence for iteration programs α∗, we need the following stronger form of co-
herence, which is inspired by the completeness proof of dual-free Game Logic in [14].
Definition 3.5 (Strongly coherent structure) We say that γ : S→ (T S)A is strongly coherent for α ∈ A
if for all Γ ∈ S and all U ⊆ S: γ̂(α)(Γ) ∈ λS(U) iff 〈α〉ξU ∧Γ isL -consistent. /
In the remainder of this subsection, we prove the following existence result.
Proposition 3.6 If L3 is one-step complete for T , then there exists a γ : S→ (T S)A which is strongly
coherent for all α ∈ A.
Let (−)] : Prop(Λ(P(S)))→Prop(Λ(Prop(Φ))) be the substitution map induced by taking U ]= ξU
for all U ∈P(S). Conversely, let (−)S : Prop(Λ(Prop(Φ)))→ Prop(Λ(P(S))) be the substitution map
induced by taking >S = S and for all ψ ∈ Prop(Φ), ψS = {∆ ∈ S | ∆ `PL ψ}.
Lemma 3.7 (Derivability) For all ϕ ∈ Prop(Λ(Prop(Φ))),
1. `1L ϕS implies `L (ϕS)].
2. `L (ϕS)]↔ ϕ .
Proof. Claim 1: For all ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(S))), `1L ψ implies that `L ψ].
It is clear that Item 1 follows from Claim 1 - let us now prove Claim 1: Suppose that `1L ψ , ie., assume
that ψ is one-step L -derivable. By the definition of one-step derivability, this means that the set {χσ |
χ ∈ Ax,σ : P→P(S)} propositionally entails ψ . This implies that ψ] is a propositional consequence
of the set W = {χσ ] | χ ∈ Ax,σ : P→P(S)}. Any formula χσ ] ∈W can be written as χτ with
τ : P→ Prop(Φ) defined as τ(p) = ξσ(p) - in other words, all elements of W are substitution instances
of L -axioms, ψ] is a propositional consequence of W and hence, as L is closed under propositional
reasoning and uniform substitution, we get `L ψ] as required.
It remains to prove item 2. We prove that for all ϕ ∈ Prop(Φ),
`L ϕ ↔ (ϕS)] (2)
Item 2 then follows by applying the congruence rule and propositional logic. For (2), it is easy to see
that for all ϕ ∈ Prop(Φ), `PL (ϕS)]→ ϕ and hence `L (ϕS)]→ ϕ . For the other implication, suppose
towards a contradiction that ϕ ∧¬(ϕS)] is L -consistent. Then there is a maximally L -consistent set Ξ
such that ϕ,¬(ϕS)] ∈ Ξ. Take ∆ := Ξ∩Φ. We have
for all ψ ∈ Prop(Φ) : ∆ `PL ψ or ∆ `PL ¬ψ (3)
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The proof is by induction on ψ . The base case where ψ ∈ Φ is trivial. If ψ = ¬ψ ′, then by I.H.
∆ `PL ψ ′ or ∆ `PL ¬ψ ′ and it follows that ∆ `PL ¬ψ or ∆ `PL ψ . If ψ = ψ1∧ψ2, then by I.H. we have:
(∆ `PL ψ1 or ∆ `PL ¬ψ1) and (∆ `PL ψ2 or ∆ `PL ¬ψ2).
Considering all four combinations yields ∆ `PL ψ1∧ψ2 or ∆ `PL ¬(ψ1∧ψ2).
From (3) and ϕ ∈ Ξ, we obtain that ∆ `PL ϕ . On the other hand, from ¬(ϕS)] ∈ Ξ it follows that
∆ 6`PL (ϕS)], and hence, because (ϕS)] = ∨{∧∆ | ∆ ∈ S,∆ `PL ϕ}, we have ∆ 6`PL ϕ . Thus we have a
contradiction, and we conclude that ϕ∧¬(ϕS)] isL -inconsistent which proves that `L ϕ→ (ϕS)]. QED
Lemma 3.8 (Existence lemma) Assume thatL3 is one-step complete for T . For all α ∈A and all Γ∈ S
there is a tα,Γ ∈ T (S) such that for all U ⊆ S,
1. If Γ `L 〈α〉ξU then tα,Γ ∈ λS(U).
2. If Γ `L ¬〈α〉ξU then tα,Γ ∈ λS(U).
3. If Γ 6`L 〈α〉ξU and 〈α〉ξU ∧Γ isL -consistent, then tα,Γ ∈ λS(U).
It follows that for all α ∈ A and all Γ ∈ S there is a tα,Γ ∈ T (S) such that for all U ⊆ S,
tα,Γ ∈ λS(U) iff Γ∧〈α〉ξU isL -consistent. (4)
Proof. We spell out the details of the proof for the case that λ is a diamond-like lifting. For the case that
λ is box-like the roles of the positive and negative formulas of the form 〈α〉ϕ and ¬〈α〉ϕ in the proof
have to be switched. We now turn to the proof of the lemma.
Suppose for a contradiction that there is α ∈ A and Γ ∈ S such that no t ∈ T S satisfies conditions 1
and 2 of the lemma. Consider the formula
ϕ(Γ) =
∨
{〈α〉ξX | X ⊆ S,Γ `PL ¬〈α〉ξX}∨
∨
{¬〈α〉ξX | X ⊆ S,Γ `PL 〈α〉ξX}
and note that
ϕ(Γ)S =
∨
{〈α〉X | X ⊆ S,Γ `PL ¬〈α〉ξX}∨
∨
{¬〈α〉X | X ⊆ S,Γ `PL 〈α〉ξX}
Then by our assumption on α and Γ we have [[ϕ(Γ)S]]1 = (T S)A. Recall from Lemma 3.2 that one-step
completeness of L3 implies one-step completeness of L wrt T A. Therefore we obtain that `1L ϕ(Γ)S
and thus, by Lemma 3.7, that `L ϕ(Γ). This yields a contradiction with our assumption that Γ is L -
consistent. For each Γ ∈ S and α ∈ A we fix an element sα,Γ ∈ T S satisfying conditions 1 and 2.
Consider now Γ ∈ S and let U ⊆ S be such that Γ 6`L 〈α〉ξU and 〈α〉ξU ∧Γ is L -consistent. As
〈α〉ξU ∧Γ isL -consistent the set {〈α〉ξU}∪{¬〈α〉ξX | Γ `PL ¬〈α〉ξX} isL -consistent and we can eas-
ily show - using Lemma 3.7 - that the set {〈α〉U}∪{¬〈α〉X | Γ `PL ¬〈α〉ξX} is one-stepL -consistent.
Therefore by one-step completeness ofL there must be an fΓ,U ∈ (T S)A such that
fΓ,U |=1
∧
({〈α〉U}∪{¬〈α〉X | Γ `PL ¬〈α〉ξX})
or, equivalently,
fΓ,U(α) ∈
⋂
({λS(U)}∪{S\λS(X) | Γ `PL ¬〈α〉ξX}) .
Using the fact that λ is diamond-like we can now easily verify that for each Γ ∈ S and α ∈ A the join
tα,Γ :=
∨
U∈Ξ fΓ,U(α)∨sα,Γ with Ξ= {U ⊆ X | Γ 6`L 〈α〉ξU and 〈α〉ξU ∧Γ isL -consistent} satisfies all
conditions of the lemma. QED
Proposition 3.6 now follows immediately from Lemma 3.8 by taking γ̂(α)(Γ) := tα,Γ for all α ∈ A0.
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3.2 Standard, coherent models
We saw in the previous subsection that one-step completeness ensures the existence of a strongly coherent
structure. However, this structure is not necessarily standard. We now show that from a strongly coherent
structure, we can obtain a standard model which satisfies the usual coherence condition by extending the
strongly structure inductively from atomic actions to all actions α ∈ A and proving that the resulting
structure map γ : S→ (T S)A is coherent.
We start by defining a γ : S→ (T S)A which is almost standard. For technical reasons, we define γ on
tests from Φ in terms of membership. Once we prove that truth is membership (Lemma 3.16), it follows
that γ is standard. This way we avoid a mutual induction argument.
Definition 3.9 (Coherent dynamic structure) Let γ0 : S → (T S)A be the strongly coherent structure
that exists by Proposition 3.6. Define γ : S→ (T S)A inductively as follows:
γ̂(α) := γ̂0(α) for α ∈ A0
γ̂(ϕ?)(Γ) :=

ηS(Γ) if ϕ ∈ Γ and ϕ ∈Φ
ηS(Γ) if Γ ∈ [[ϕ]](X ,γ,V ) and ϕ 6∈Φ
⊥T S otherwise.
γ̂(σ(α1, . . . ,αn))(Γ) := σS(γ̂(α1)(Γ), . . . , γ̂(αn)(Γ)))
γ̂(α∗)(Γ) := γ̂(α)∗(Γ)
where V is the canonical valuation V (p) = {∆ ∈ S | p ∈ ∆}. /
The rest of the section will be dedicated to proving that γ is in fact coherent. This can be done largely
similarly to what we did in our previous work [6] for the iteration-free case. The main difference is ob-
viously the presence of the ∗-operator. Here a crucial role is played by the following monotone operator
onP(S) that allows us to formalise a logic-induced notion of reachability.
Definition 3.10 (FXβ ) For β ∈ A and X ⊆ S we define an operator
FXβ :PS → PS
Y 7→ {∆ ∈ S | ∆∧〈β 〉ξY consistent}∪X
It is easy to see that this is a monotone operator, its least fixpoint will be denoted by ZXβ . /
Lemma 3.11 For all ∆ ∈ S and all X ⊆ S we have: ∆∧〈β 〉ξZXβ is consistent ⇒ ∆ ∈ Z
X
β .
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that ZXβ is a fixpoint of F
X
β . QED
The following technical lemma is required for the inductive proof of the first coherence Lemma 3.14.
Lemma 3.12 Let β ∈ A be an action such that for all Γ ∈ S and all X ⊆ S we have
Γ∧〈β 〉ξX consistent ⇒ γ̂(Γ) ∈ λS(X).
Then Γ ∈ ZXβ implies γ̂(β ∗)(Γ) ∈ λS(X).
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Proof. This proof is using our assumption that λ is diamond-like. Recall first that by definition we have
γ̂(β ∗) = γ̂(β )∗, thus we need to show that γ̂(β )∗(Γ) ∈ λS(X). Let Y = {∆ ∈ S | γ̂(β )∗(∆) ∈ λS(X)}. In
order to prove our claim it suffices to show that FXβ (Y )⊆ Y , ie, that Y is a prefixed point of FXβ (as ZXβ is
the smallest such prefixed point and as ZXβ ⊆ Y is equivalent to the claim of the lemma). Let Γ ∈ FXβ (Y ).
We need to show that Γ ∈ Y . In case Γ ∈ X we have γ̂0(Γ) = η(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ) because η(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ)
is equivalent to Γ ∈ X as λ̂ is a monad morphism. Suppose now that Γ∧ 〈β 〉ξY is consistent. By our
assumption on β this implies that
γ̂(β )(Γ) ∈ λS(Y ) = λS({∆ | γ̂(β )∗(∆) ∈ λS(X)}).
Using Lemma 2.8 this implies
(γ̂(β )∗ γ̂(β )∗)(Γ) ∈ λS(X)
and
γ̂(β )∗ γ̂(β )∗(Γ) = (γ̂(β )∗
∨
i
γ̂(β )[i])(Γ) =
∨
i
γ̂(β )[i+1](Γ)
where the last equality follows from the fact that we are working with a monad T whose Kleisli compo-
sition left-distributes over joins. As λ is assumed to be diamond-like, it follows that there is a j≥ 1 such
that γ̂(β )[ j](Γ) ∈ λS(X) and thus Γ ∈ Y as required. QED
We are now ready to prove two crucial coherence lemmas. As we are ultimately only interested in the
truth of formulas in Φ we can confine ourselves to what we call relevant actions:
Definition 3.13 (Relevant test, relevant action) A test ϕ? is called relevant if ϕ ∈Φ. An action α ∈ A
is called relevant if it only contains relevant tests. /
The following lemma proves the first half of the announced coherence.
Lemma 3.14 For all relevant actions α ∈ A, Γ ∈ S and all X ⊆ S we have
Γ∧〈α〉ξX consistent ⇒ γ̂(α)(Γ) ∈ λS(X).
Proof. By induction on α . The base case holds trivially as γ is strongly coherent for all atomic actions.
Let α =ϕ? for some ϕ ∈Φ (here we can assume ϕ ∈Φ as we only consider relevant actions) and suppose
Γ∧〈ϕ?〉ξX is consistent for some X ⊆ S. Then, as λ is diamond-like, we have Γ∧ϕ ∧ξX is consistent.
This implies ϕ ∈ Γ and Γ ∈ X . As ϕ ∈ Γ, we have by the definition of γ that γ̂(ϕ?)(Γ) = ηS(Γ) and thus
Γ ∈ X implies γ̂(ϕ?)(Γ) ∈ λS(X) as required.
For an n-ary pointwise operation σ ∈ Σ, we want to show that
Γ∧〈σ(αa, . . . ,αn)〉ξX consistent ⇒ σSS (γ̂(α1)(Γ), . . . , γ̂(αn)(Γ)) ∈ λS(X)
Using the σ -axiom and that λ̂ ◦σ = χ ◦ λ̂ n, this is equivalent to
Γ∧ϕ(χ˘,α1, . . . ,αn,ξX) consistent ⇒ X ∈ χS(λ̂ (γ̂(α1)(Γ)), . . . , λ̂ (γ̂(αn)(Γ))) (5)
and (5) can be proved by induction on χ˘ in a manner very similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma
27 in [6].
Suppose α is of the form α = β0;β1 and suppose Γ∧ 〈β0;β1〉ξU is consistent for some U ⊆ S.
Using the compositionality axiom we have `L 〈β0;β1〉ξU ↔ 〈β0〉〈β1〉ξU . Therefore Γ∧〈β0〉〈β1〉ξU is
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consistent. This implies in turn that Γ∧ 〈β0〉(>∧〈β1〉ξU) is consistent and, as `L >↔ ∨∆∈S∧∆ by
Lemma 3.7, we obtain that Γ∧ 〈β0〉((∨∆∈S∧∆)∧〈β1〉ξU) and thus Γ∧ 〈β0〉(∨∆∈S∧(∆∧〈β1〉ξU)) is
consistent. Clearly the latter implies that Γ∧〈β0〉(∨∆∈Y ∧(∆∧〈β1〉ξU)) is consistent for Y := {∆ ∈ S |
∆∧ 〈β1〉ξU consistent}. Therefore we also have Γ∧ 〈β0〉ξY is consistent. Now we apply the induction
hypothesis to get
γ̂(β0)(Γ) ∈ λS(Y ) = λS({∆ ∈ S | ∆∧〈β1〉ξU consistent})
I.H.⊆ λS({∆ ∈ S | γ̂(β1)(∆) ∈ λS(U)})
and by Lemma 2.8 we conclude that γ̂(β0;β1)(Γ) = γ̂(β0)∗ γ̂(β1)(Γ) ∈ λS(U).
Suppose now α = β ∗. It follows from Lemma 3.12 and the I.H. on β that Γ∈ ZXβ implies γ̂(β ∗)(Γ)∈
λS(X). Therefore it suffices to prove that Γ∧〈β ∗〉ξX is consistent implies Γ ∈ ZXβ .
Suppose that Γ∧〈β ∗〉ξX is consistent and recall the -induction rule:
` 〈β 〉ψ ∨ϕ → ψ
` 〈β ∗〉ϕ → ψ
Our claim is that
` 〈β 〉ξZXβ ∨ξX → ξZXβ (+)
Before we prove (+) let us see why it suffices to complete the proof: If (+) holds, we can apply the
induction rule in order to obtain
` 〈β ∗〉ξX → ξZXβ . (6)
By assumption we have Γ∧〈β ∗〉ξX . Together with (6) this implies that Γ∧ξZXβ are consistent and thus,
by Lemma 3.11, that Γ ∈ ZXβ as required.
Proof of (+): Suppose for a contradiction that (+) does not hold. This implies that (〈β 〉ξZXβ ∨ξX)∧
¬ξZXβ is consistent. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 〈β 〉ξZXβ ∧¬ξZXβ is consistent. Then there is a maximal consistent set Ξ such that 〈β 〉ξZXβ ,¬ξZXβ ∈Ξ.
Let ∆ := Ξ∩Φ. By definition and (3) we know that ∆ `L ¬ξZXβ and thus ∆ ∈ S \ Z
X
β . Furthermore
∆∧〈β 〉ξZXβ is consistent. The latter implies, again by Lemma 3.11, that ∆ ∈ Z
X
β which is a contradiction
and we conclude that 〈β 〉ξZXβ ∧¬ξZXβ cannot be consistent.
Case 2 ξX ∧¬ξZXβ is consistent. Again - using a similar argument to the previous case - this implies that
there is an atom ∆ ∈ S \ZXβ such that ∆∧ ξX is consistent. But the latter entails that ∆ ∈ X ⊆ ZXβ which
yields an obvious contradiction. QED
Lemma 3.15 For all 〈α〉ϕ ∈Φ and all Γ ∈ S we have
γ̂(α)(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ) ⇒ 〈α〉ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Again this is proven by induction on α . Let α = ψ? and suppose γ̂(ψ?)(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ) for some
〈ψ?〉ϕ ∈ Φ. As λ is diamond-like, we have γ̂(ψ?)(Γ) 6= ⊥ and thus, by the definition of γ̂ , we have
ψ ∈ Γ and ηS(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ). The latter implies Γ ∈ ϕˆ , ie, ϕ ∈ Γ. Both ψ ∈ Γ and ϕ ∈ Γ imply, using the
axiom `L 〈ψ?〉ϕ ↔ ψ ∧ϕ , that 〈ψ?〉ϕ ∈ Γ as required.
Let α be of the form α = β ∗ and let Γ ∈ S be such that γ̂(α)(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ). Then γ̂(α) = γ̂(β )∗ and
thus we have γ̂(β )∗(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ). This means that ∨ j γ̂(β )[ j](Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ). By diamond-likeness of λ this
is equivalent to the existence of one j ≥ 0 such that γ̂(β )[ j](Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ).
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In case j = 0 we can easily see that Γ ∈ ϕˆ , ie, ϕ ∈ Γ which implies - using the axiom (〈β 〉〈β ∗〉ϕ ∨
ϕ)↔ 〈β ∗〉ϕ - that 〈β ∗〉ϕ ∈ Γ.
Suppose now j = m+1, ie, γ̂(β )[m+1](Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ). By Lemma 2.8 this implies that
γ̂(β )(Γ) ∈ λS
Ä
{∆ | γ̂(β )[m](∆) ∈ λS(ϕˆ)}
ä
.
By I.H. on m we have {∆ | γ̂(β )[m](∆) ∈ λ (ϕˆ)} ⊆÷〈β ∗〉ϕ and hence, by monotonicity of λ , that
γ̂(β )(Γ) ∈ λS(÷〈β ∗〉ϕ).
By I.H. on β this implies that 〈β 〉〈β ∗〉ϕ ∈ Γ and thus - using again the same axiom as in the base case -
that 〈β ∗〉ϕ ∈ Γ. QED
Lemma 3.16 (Dynamic truth lemma) The coalgebra structure γ : S→ (T S)A from Def. 3.9 together
with the valuation V : P→P(S) given by V (p) = pˆ for p ∈ P0 forms a θ -dynamic T-model such that
for all ϕ ∈Φ we have [[ϕ]] = ϕˆ .
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.14 and Lemma 3.15 that for all 〈α〉ϕ ∈Φ we have
〈α〉ϕ ∈ Γ iff γ̂(α)(Γ) ∈ λS(ϕˆ).
Therefore it follows by Lemma 3.4 that [[ϕ]] = ϕˆ for all ϕ ∈Φ as required. In particular this shows that
the resulting model is θ -dynamic, since for all relevant tests ϕ? we have ϕ ∈ Γ iff Γ ∈ [[ϕ]]. QED
Theorem 3.17 If L3 = ({3},Ax, /0,Ru) is one-step complete with respect to the T -coalgebraic se-
mantics given by λ , and θ consists of positive operations, then the dynamic logic L =L (θ , ; ,∗ ,?) is
(weakly) complete with respect to the class of all θ -dynamic T-models.
Proof. Assume that ψ is an L -consistent formula. Let S be the set of L -atoms over Φ = Cl(ψ) and
let γ : S→ (T S)A be defined as in Definition 3.9 and V the valuation given by V (p) = pˆ for p ∈ P0. By
Lemma 3.16, M = (S,γ,λ ,V ) is a θ -dynamic T-model. Since ψ is L -consistent there is an L -atom
∆ ∈ S that contains ψ and hence by the Dynamic Truth Lemma 3.16, ψ is true at ∆ in M. QED
As corollaries to our main theorem we obtain completeness for a number of concrete dynamic modal
logics.
Corollary 3.18 (i) We recover the classic result that PDL is complete with respect to ∪-dynamic P-
models from the fact that the diamond version of the modal logic K is one-step complete with respect
toP (cf. [17]), ∪ is a positive natural operation onP , and the Kripke diamond λX(U) = {V ∈PX |
V ∩U 6= /0} is monotonic and its transpose is a monad morphism. (ii) Taking as base logic L3 the
monotonic modal logic M with semantics given by the usual monotonic neighbourhood predicate lifting
λX(U) = {N ∈MX |U ∈ N} with rank-1 axiomatisation Ax = {3(p∧q)→3p}, it is well known that
L3 is one-step complete for M , see also [6]. Since ∪ is a positive natural operation on M , we get
that dual-free GL is complete with respect to ∪-dynamic M -models. (iii) Similarly, dual-free GL with
intersection is complete with respect to ∪,∩-dynamicM -models.
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4 Conclusion
There are several ways in which to continue our research. Firstly we will look for other, new examples
that fit into our general coalgebraic framework. A first good candidate seems to be the filter monad
F (cf. [5, 9, 20]). It is easy to see that taking upsets yields a monad morphism τ : P ⇒ F and the
induced join onFX is intersection of filters. We note that filters are not closed under unions (only under
updirected unions), so ∪ is not a natural operation on F . Taking L3 to be the diamond version of
modal logic K, and λ : Q⇒Q ◦F to be λX(U) = {F ∈FX | X \U 6∈ F} (i.e., the dual of the usual
neigbourhood modality), then L3 is complete with respect to the class of all F -coalgebras, since any
Kripke model (X ,ρ : X →PX ,V ) is pointwise equivalent with the F -model (X ,τ ◦ρ : X →FX ,V ),
hence any ϕ that can be falsified in a Kripke model can also be falsified in a filter coalgebra, cf. [2]. We
conjecture thatL3 is one-step complete forF and λ . From this, a completeness result would follow for
a new PDL-like logic for the filter monad with intersection on actions.
Secondly, we will study variations of our coalgebraic framework to monads that carry quantitative
information to cover important cases such as probabilistic and weighted transition systems. We expect
that we need to switch to a multivalued logic, using for example T (1) as truth value object, as in [3].
In general, we would also like to better understand how our exogenous logics relate to the endogenous
coalgebraic logics of [3] and the weakest preconditions arising from state-and-effect triangles in, e.g., [9,
8]. One difference is that in [3], the monad T is assumed to be commutative. This condition ensures that
the Kleisli category is enriched over Eilenberg-Moore algebras. This could be an interesting approach
to obtaining a “canonical” algebra of program operations, even though, Eilenberg-Moore algebras do
not have canonical representations in terms of operations and equations. Moreover, one of our main
example monads, the monotonic neighbourhood monad is not commutative, but it is still amenable to
our framework.
Finally, our most ambitious aim will be to extend our coalgebraic framework to a completeness proof
which will entail completeness of full GL which remains an open problem [15]. One reason that this is a
difficult problem is that, unlike PDL, full GL is able to express fixpoints of arbitrary alternation depth [1].
References
[1] D. Berwanger (2003): Game Logic is strong enough for parity games. Studia Logica 75(2), pp. 205–219,
doi:10.1023/A:1027358927272.
[2] B. F. Chellas (1980): Modal Logic - An Introduction. Cambridge University Press,
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511621192.
[3] C. Cıˆrstea (2014): A Coalgebraic Approach to Linear-Time Logics. In A. Muscholl, editor: Foundations of
Software Science and Computation Structures - 17th International Conference, FOSSACS 2014, Proceedings,
LNCS 8412, Springer, pp. 426–440, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54830-7 28.
[4] M. J. Fischer & R. F. Ladner (1979): Propositional dynamic logic of regular programs. J. of Computer and
System Sciences 18, pp. 194–211.
[5] H. Peter Gumm (2005): From T-Coalgebras to Filter Structures and Transition Systems. In: Algebra and
Coalgebra in Computer Science: First International Conference, CALCO 2005, Swansea, UK, September
3-6, 2005, Proceedings, LNCS 3629, Springer, pp. 194–212.
[6] H.H. Hansen, C. Kupke & R.A. Leal (2014): Strong Completeness for Iteration-Free Coalgebraic Dy-
namic Logics. Technical Report, ICIS, Radboud University Nijmegen. Available at https://pms.cs.
ru.nl/iris-diglib/src/icis_tech_reports.php. See also updated version at http://homepage.
tudelft.nl/c9d1n/papers/cpdl-techrep.pdf.
H.H. Hansen & C. Kupke 15
[7] H.H. Hansen, C. Kupke & R.A. Leal (2014): Strong completeness of iteration-free coalgebraic dynamic
logics. In J. Diaz, I. Lanese & D. Sangiorgi, editors: Theoretical Computer Science (TCS 2014). 8th IFIP
TC 1/WG 2.2 International Conference, LNCS 8705, Springer, pp. 281–295, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44602-
7 22.
[8] B. Jacobs (2014): Dijkstra monads in monadic computation. In M.M. Bonsangue, editor: Proceedings of
CMCS 2014, LNCS 8446, Springer.
[9] B. Jacobs (2015): A recipe for state-and-effect triangles. In: Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science:
Sixth International Conference (CALCO 2015), Proceedings, LIPIcs, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
fuer Informatik.
[10] D. Kozen (1983): Results on the propositional mu-calculus. Theoretical Computer Science 27, pp. 333–354.
[11] D. Kozen & R. Parikh (1981): An elementary proof of the completeness of PDL. Theoretical Computer
Science 14, pp. 113–118.
[12] C. Kupke & D. Pattinson (2011): Coalgebraic semantics of modal logics: an overview. Theoretical Computer
Science 412(38), pp. 5070–5094.
[13] S. MacLane (1998): Categories for the Working Mathematician, 2nd edition. Springer.
[14] R. Parikh (1985): The logic of games and its applications. In: Topics in the Theory of Computation, Annals
of Discrete Mathematics 14, Elsevier.
[15] M. Pauly & R. Parikh (2003): Game Logic: An Overview. Studia Logica 75(2), pp. 165–182.
[16] J. J. M. M. Rutten (2000): Universal Coalgebra: A Theory of Systems. Theoretical Computer Science 249,
pp. 3–80.
[17] L. Schro¨der & D. Pattinson (2009): Strong completeness of coalgebraic modal logics. In: Proceedings of
STACS 2009, pp. 673–684.
[18] Lutz Schro¨der (2007): A finite model construction for coalgebraic modal logic. J. Log. Algebr. Program.
73(1-2), pp. 97–110.
[19] I. Walukiewicz (2000): Completeness of Kozen’s Axiomatisation of the Propositional µ-Calculus. Inf. Com-
put. 157(1-2), pp. 142–182.
[20] O. Wyler (1981): Algebraic theories of continuous lattices. In B. Banaschewski & R.-E. Hoffman, editors:
Continuous Lattices, Lect. Notes Math. 871, Springer, Berlin.
